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Hon. Consultant in Malaria to the War Olice
I CANNOT tell you how much I appreciate the honour that the Committee has done
me in its invitation to give the Robert Campbell Memorial Oration. I feel especially
proud as I have had the honour, the privilege, and the pleasure not only of being
one of his old students, but also of serving under him as a resident pupil and as a
house surgeon in the Royal Victoria Hospital.
Before I aeal with my subject-"Malaria in War," I must say a few words on
a text that Kipling has modified from the Scriptures-"Let us now praise famous
men, for their work continueth, greater than their knowing."
We are gathered here to-night to keep alive the memory of a famous man, Mr.
Robert Campbell, whose work continueth greater than he in his modesty would
ever have anticipated. I see here to-night many of his old colleagues and students
who must have felt the stimulus of his example and teaching as I did.
As a teacher I have known few to equal Robert Campbell. He explained his
theses with the simplicity, lucidity, and logic that mark the born and inspired
teacher. He showed that he had his subject at his fingertips, both mentally and
practically. He taught one not to accept what at first sight appeared to be an
obvious and simple diagnosis, without first fully weighing the pros and cons of
other possibilities. I think it was he who first laid the foundation in my mind for
the acceptance of that great principle in research work: "Never take authority
when you can get fact, and never guess when you can know." He taught one to
be critical, and more especially of one's own work.
His technique as a surgeon was a delight to watch, and I fortunately had many
opportunities of observing it at close quarters. He was no mere carpenter, but
a surgeon in the very best and widest meaning of that term-a surgeon must-be
a clinician first. The greatest benefit of his patients was always his aim. As a
result his patients had unbounded confidence in him.
He was a faithful friend, a wise counsellor, and an ever-present help in time
of need. I wish I was more worthy of paying a suitable tribute to his memory and
to that greatness which he never advertised. It is only right that his memory
should be kept green by the Belfast Medical School, for which he did so much.
GENERAL INCIDENCE OF MALARIA IN WAR.
The majority of diseases that affect armies are preventable, and a study of
past campaigns has shown that many more men are disabled by sickness than
by enemy action. Instances- have occurred where whole armies have been
incapacitated by disease, even before reaching the scene of operations. Expeditions
have had to be abandoned owing to the ravages of disease. During the First
World War, the ratio of battle casualties to sick admissions was 1 to 1.3 in
Flanders, while in Egypt and Palestine it was about 1 to 10, in Mesopotamia
1 to 13, in'Macedonia 1 to 27, and in East Africa 1 to 33.
3As can be seen from these figures, the ratio rises very rapidly when the tropics
or the subtropics are the scenes of operations. This increase is caused partly by
the fact that continuous pitched battles occur more commonly in the temperate
zones, but mainly because in the tropics-'
(i) Disease is more prevalent;
(ii`) European troops have had no opportunity of developing any immunity
to many unfamiliar diseases, and
(iii) The local conditions are more suitable for the spread of disease, and
these are greatly increased by war.
In such theatres, malaria and dysentery are the two commonest causes of
morbidity, and of these malaria is the most devastating.
Nowadays, the importance of malaria in war does not lie in the number-of deaths
caused (usually in the past considerably less than one per cent. of the case-incidence).
It is in the widespread debility, both physical and mental, that it produces with
resultant enormous loss of fighting strength, of efficiency, and sometimes of morale.
It is evident that all such tropical campaigns are from the first sanitary ones.
It is just as necessary to prevent needless casualties from disease as from enemy
action An army is mobilised to go to battle, not to hospital. It has been proved
by experience gained in many previous campaigns (vide infra) that not only may
the speed of operations be very greatly delayed by the effects of malaria, but in
prolonged ones the wastage of manpower produced by this disease alone may be
a decisive factor in preventing a successful outcome.
Field Marshal Smuts stated that the East Africa campaign of 1915-18 was "one
against nature in which climate, geography and disease fought more effectively
against us than the well-trained forces of the enemy." This is equally applicable
to the recent campaigns in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific. Climate
and geography were so favourable to the spread of malaria that in those theatres
this disease, and not the Japanese, was recognised as "Enemy No. 1." In the
earlv days it caused many times as many casualties as the enemy's land, air and
sea forces combined.
RECORDS OF MALARIA IN MILITARY HISTORY.
There is a large amount of conclusive evidence to show that malaria has had a
remarkably adverse effect on military operations from the earliest times, and so
has changed the history of the world.
Cardamatis, the Greek malariologist, presumes that the disease which attacked
the Greeks before Troy about 1500 B.C. was malaria due to t'he swampy nature
of the ground.
When the "Assyrian came down like a wolf on the fold," they had first to
traverse the very malarious Jordan valley before attacking Jerusalem (c. 700 B.C.).
Genovese thinks that "the Angel of Death" which smote Sennacherib's host was
malaria contracted in that valley.1
Although there may be some uncertainty about the validity of the contention
1. This valley lived up to its evil reputation for malaria in both World Wars.
4that malaria was introduced into Italy by the Punic invasions about 200 B.C., there
is little doubt that both the Carthegenean and the Roruan armies had enormous
casualties from this disease. During the Civil Wars in Italy the health of Caesar's
army was broken by malaria (Celli, 1933).2
Tacitus reported that Gallic and Germanic troops (non-immunes) suffered
severely through camping in the unhealthy environs of the Vatican Hill. Repeatedly
northern barbarians-Goths, Huns, and Lombards-who attacked and despoiled
Rome, were decimated through the agency of malaria (Hoops, 1934).
Jones (1909) has written a book to show how the decadence of the Greeks, in
both their military and cultural spheres, was brought about by malaria.
Malaria took a heavy toll of the Crusaders in Palestine. The armies of Salah
ed Din and Richard Cceur de Lion are said to have suffered severely from "fever,"
while facing each other in the Birket Ramadan swamps on the Palestinian coast.3
Apparently an armistice had to be declared for this reason (Vickers, 1942).
In 1167, the finest army ever commanded by Frederick Barbarossa was decimated
in the Roman Campagna by this disease. "Obscure soldiers, nobles and illustrious
prelates laid down their lives there. The flower of a nation was exterminated"
(Balfour, 1924).
The great military surgeon, Pringle, describes the intense malaria prevailing
in the British army in Flanders during Marlborough's campaigns, and in Scotland
before and after the Battle of Culloden (Hoops, 1934).4
To come to more recent times, when Napoleon set out for Egypt in 1798 with
the best army of France, a successful campaign would probably have changed the
history of the world. His army, camped near Acre, became riddled with malaria
and plag'ue. Our fleet prevented him getting reinforcements of healthy troops,
and his grandiose eastern scheme was frustrated.5
In our wars with the Dutch in Java. about 1800, the personnel of the fleet
engaged there were so stricken by this disease that Edam was described as a
"regular charnel house."16
The ill-fated Walcheren expedition of 1809 to the Lowlands is often quoted as a
striking example of the devastating effects of malaria. Some more recent inves-
tigations cast grave doubt upon the malarial causation of this catasfrophe
(Swellengrebel and de Buck, 1938).
In the Rangoon Expedition of 1824-25, only 35 deaths were due to wounds,
2. His troops were largely non-immunes from Gaul and Spain, and had spent the autumn in
the highly malarious regions'of Apulia and Brindisi. The latter place again became notorious
during the First World War (Robertson, 1920).
3. Similarly in 1918, these swamps were responsible for a heavy malarial morbidity among
Allenby's troops.
4. The cases during the 1745 campaign were probably cases of chronic relapsing benign tertian
malaria. Similar outbreaks have been a prominent feature among troops returning to the United
Kingdom from malarious theatres in both the last wars.
5. The area between Haifa and Acre was still one of the most malarious in Palestine in 1942.
Large engineering and other anti-malarial work initiated by the Army have now reduced the
danger- to a low level.
6. Shields, the naval surgeon there, has given a most graphic account of the epidemic.
5while 450 out of every 1,000 engaged died of malaria. The Arakan Expedition of
1826 had to be abandoned owing to this fever: "Everyone who was not dead
was in hospital"!!
Our troops in the Crimean War also suffered severely from malaria. Macdonald
(1923) points out that some of this force occupied practically the same position as
the Macedonian Expeditionary Force did in the First World War, and were affected
by malaria to the same extent (vide infra).
"In August 1851, from being in extraordinarily fit condition in the
previous months, the armies of the Balkan P-eninsula were suddenly
prostrated by disease. Apart from the hospital sick, it was universally
admitted that no man in the ranks, though not on the sick list, was capable
of active field service."
Malaria was the chief cause of sickness in the Chino-Japanese war of 1894-5.
In the Ashanti Expedition of 1896, there were in six months 1,491 admissions to
hospital for malaria in a force of about 5,000, with a sick rate of 40 per cent.
among the officers.
It might possibly he said that most of these examples are relatively old history,
occurring before the discovery of the mosquito carriage of malaria, and many before
the value of quinine was fully recognised or adequate supplies available. Unfor-
tunately many similar disasters were reported during the first World War.7
In that war, malaria had a most important adverse influence on almost all fronts
except Flanders. In tropical and sub-tropical theatres, it caused more casualties
than any other single factor; the mass debility produced exceeded by far the losses
from any other cause. It was responsible for from three to ten times more casualties
than enemy action. Indeed, in East Africa the ratio was as high as twenty times.
In fronts such as Macedonia, East Africa, Palestine and Syria, malaria placed
a very serious obstacle in the way of successful military operations. The losses of
numerical strength and the general deterioration of health, both physical and
mental, was enormous among the troops.
On the Macedonian front the average annual admission rate for the years 1916-18
was 404 per 1000. A total of 168,751 hospital admissions were reported, and 25,000
of the more chronic cases had to be evacuated in 1918 (one-fifth of the average
strength of the force). One division had 5,000 admissions in one month.
Our French allies there were in no better position. General Sarrail reported that
he could only put 20,000 men in the field out of a force nominally six times that
number: "My army is immobilised in hospital," he said. The troops of the Central
Powers recorded an infection rate of 20 per cent. in Albania in 1916. This rose to
52 per cent. in 1917. Personnel in certain areas had an incidence of 70-90 per cent.,
and, if relapses be counted, 168-180 per cent.
The enemy, therefore, derived no benefit from the Allies' disability. "Malaria,
as usual, was exploiting a favourable situation to the utmost and had joined battle
on both sides. We had the spectacle of three fine armies, backed by the most
7. Most of the statistics about this war have been taken from volumes of the Official History
of the War. Medical Services (1923 et seq.)
6powerful nations of Europe and equipped regardless of expense with every modern
appointment, virtually paralysed before they were able to strike a blow"
(Hackett, 1937).
A remarkable example of the potentialities of malaria in war was seen during
the Palestine-Syria campaign of 1918. Allenby's final advance started on 19th
September. A severe epidemic of malaria began on 5th October, and 20,000 cases
were reported before the end of that year. During the advance 773 men died of
malaria. The infection was contracted while passing through the malaria-ridden
country behind the enemy's front line, more especially through the notorious
Jordan Valley (cf. the Assyrians mentioned previously). Fortunately in the interval
before the epidemic burst, the Turkish armies had been decisively defeated-the
campaign was won by troops in the incubation period of malaria! If the advance
had been held up by the enemy for another two weeks,- a great victory might have
been replaced by disaster with far-reaching consequences.
The incidence of malaria was even greater in the East Africa campaign (a truly
tropical one) than in any other. Here of the recorded hospital admissions, fifty-
seven per cent. were due to this disease. The annual admission rate rose to 1,423
per 1,000 in 1918, and probably at least a quarter of a million cases occurred
during the campaign in a force with an average strength of about 50,000
(Keyworth, 1929).
General Van Deventer in 1917 reported that owing to sickness, especially malaria,
the number of men available for duty had no relation to the nominal strength of
the force. A Brigade which could muster 1,400 rifles was fortunate.
In 1917-1918, one-third of the Spanish Armiy in Morocco was immobilised by
malaria. One battalion of 890 men had 286 cases and 32 deaths in one year.
When operations on the North-West Frontier of India occur during the malaria
season, a large amount of sickness and disability arises from this disease. For
example, in the Mohmand Bajaur campaign (August to October, 1933), the hospital
admissions for malaria were 418 per 1,0Q0 over the whole period of the campaign.
Apart from the effects of malaria upon armies as a whole, its effects upon famous
commanders and noted personalities must have done much to affect the course
of history.
Jones (1909) thinks that the "thorn in the flesh" referred to by St. Paul was
malaria. Alexander the Great reached Babylon in 323 B.C. on his return journey
from India. He died there at the age of thirty-three years from a sickness which
some think was malarial, thus preventing him from finding new worlds to conquer.
Alaric, the first barbarian prince to conquer Rome, died of malaria (A.D. 400).
When Philip the Bold of France besieged and took Gerona in Spain in September,
1282, his army was almost destroyed by malaria. He himself succumbed to an
attack at Perpignan.
Even Irish history has not escaped the influence of malaria. The famous Earls,
the hope of the Irish nation, who fled to the Continent from Rathmullen in 1607,
succumbed to this disease.
"In July, 1608, the Duke of Tyrconnel and the Barons of O'Neill and
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cO'Domhail (sic!) with their chaplain and two pages went to Ostia [a
notoriously malarious place near Rome], where they remained for two days.
After their return they all fell ill with fever. The Duke, the chaplain and
one of the pages died. The two surviving noblemen were advised by doctors
to change their place of residence; from the Borgo they went to live in a
palace near Monte Citorio, which was considered healthy. In September
O'Domhail died. The next year Baron O'Neill also died, probably from
a recurrence of fever. lThus the last hope of the Irish patriots was in its
turn destroyed by the Roman marsh fever. (Medicean Archives, F.3624.,
8 Oct., 1609; The Flight of the Earls, Dublin, 1916) (Celli, 1933).
Cromwell, the Great Protector, died of a "quartan," and James I, "the wisest
fool in Christendom," of a "tertian."
Such individual events must undoubtedly have affected the fate of nations and
the course of history.
It must also be brought to mind that the two greatest basic discoveries in
malariology were made by army officers. Laveran, a doctor in the French Army
in Algiers, discovered the malaria parasite in 1880. Ross of the Indian
Medical Service demonstrated in 1897-8 that this parasite was transmitted
by mosquito bites.8
THE MAIN FACTORS IN THE SPREAD OF MALARIAL INFECTIONS.
Before entering into the details of any scheme for the control of malaria in war,
it is necessary to summarise briefly the various factors involved. These include
the human host, the malaria parasite, and the anopheline mosquito. They may be
visualised as a series of beads joined by links to form a chain with side-chains,
which may be endless in nature.
Their relationships are shown graphically in 'Fable I, from which it can be seen
that the links connecting the two animal hosts of the parasite, man and mosquito,
are the bites of anopheline mosquitoes. This is the only way the disease can be
conveyed in nature. It is evident, therefore, that theoretically the prevention of the
spread of malaria is simple-the prevention of the bites of infected mosquitoes.
But, as Napoleon has said about war: "TIhe principles are simple, the difficulties
lie in their execution."
In war the immediate object is to conserve man-power by keeping men fit until
the operations are ended; the morbid effects of disease that may develop at a later
date are of less urgency. Therefore, any scheme for the control of the malaria
menace in war contains two main factors-(a) the prevention or diminution in the
transmission of infection, and (b) the control or suppression of any disability likely
to be caused by such infections as have not been prevented.
PREVENTION OF THE TRANSMISSION OF MALARIAL INFECTION.
Theoretically such transmission may be stopped (a) by preventing the bites of
8. It is of interest to note that in 1807, Dr. John Crawford, a native of Ireland, who had
settled in Baltimore, U.S.A., published an article in the Baltinmore Observer, entitled "Mosquital
Origin of Malaria Disease" (Russell, 1943).
8infective mosquitoes, or (b) by attacks on the parasite in either (i) its insect host
or (ii) its human one, so preventing the acquisition of infection by man or insects.
TABLE I.
THE SPREAD OF MALARIAL INFECTIONS.
The Infected Human Host ii' : (Carrier of asexual malarial parasites)
¢ ~~~becomes
The Infective Human Host -
(Carrier of gametocytes or sexual parasites).
cs M Who is bitten by The Susceptible Insect Host
W: (Anopheline mosquito)
XVhich becomes The Infected Insect Host
and then
The Infective Insect Host
z; g This bites The Susceptible Hutman Host
Who becomes The Infected Human Host.
(vide 1 supra).
A. Prevention of Mosquito Bites.
Such defensive measures fall into two main groups
(a) Direct protection against the bites, and
(b) Diminution in the chances of acquiring an infective bite by reduction in the
number of the mosquito population.
1. DIRECT PROTECTION AGAINST MOSQUITo BITES.
The measures used may be either chemical or mecqhanical.
(a) Chemical Protection against Mosquito Bites.
These consist of the application of creams or lotions, mainly to the exposed
portions of the body, to repel the mosquito or otherwise deter it from biting. Many
substances had been used in the past. Citronella was the chief ingredient employed
in such preparations both in the first World War and in the interval of peace
which followed it. Unfortunately, this substance was not one-hundred-per-cent.
efficient, especially in the presence of intenrse anophelism. This fact, combined with
the greasy nature of the standard preparations, made it very unpopular, so its use
was difficult to enforce among troops.
Early in 1943, a vanishing cream containing pyrethrum was devised in the Middle
East Force. This was a great improvement. At the same time teams of expert
9workers both in the United Kingdom and America had been engaged in intensive
research to find a better repellent. As a result of the trial of many hundreds of
compounds, a very effective substance was found-dimethyl phthalate (now usually
known as DMP). This substancie is used alone in the British Army, but the American
preparations are reinforced with two other good repellents-indalone and Rutger's
612. DMP was a standard issue to all troops in malarious areas during the last
years of the war. It was very effective.
The lasting duration of an application of DMP is, however, only about two to
three hours at most. This means that in those circumstances where troops cannot
use mosquito nets, they would have to be awakened every few hours to reapply
their repellent. This is not a practical pfoposition. It was found, however, that
head veils made of wide-mesh (three-eighth inch) netting, when impregnated with
DMP would retain their protective properties during the night hours. Arrangements
were being made for a very-extensive issue of these when peace was declared. They
will presumably be used by our troops garrisoning malarious regions in the tropics
in future.
(b) Mechanical Protection against Mosquito Bites.
(I) INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION.
Clothing.-The more the body is covered by clothing the less chance has a
mosquito to bite. The shorts and short-sleeved shirts which were worn by troops
in warm climates during the early stages of the war gave little protection against
mosquito bites after dusk, especially when combined with the relatively poor
qualities of the Citronella ointment. In theory the troops were supposed to change
into tunics and trousers before dusk, but under many active-service conditions this
was impossible or not carried out. After a prolonged campaign by the Medical
Services, the latter type of uniform was accepted as the standard for active service
conditioiqs in most parts of the tropics, and shorts were forbidden except for games.
Unfortunatety this was not a complete solution of the problem. Many of the
types of fabric available for uniforms were of such a texture that some kinds of
mosquito could bite through it, especially when tightly stretched. This could be
greatly diminished by applications of DMP. Eventually a fabric of the poplin or
gabardine type was evolved which, while light, gave a very high degree of
protection. Large supplies of suitable material only began to be available shortly
before the war ended.
Mosquito Nets.-As mosquitoes bite mostly at night, to sleep under a proper
mosquito net is one of the greatest protections against malarial transmission. It
Was probably the most effective measure used in the first World War, and formed
a very important individual issue to the soldier in the recent struggle. The peace-
time type of net was, however, bulky, and often difficult to erect properly in the
field, so its use was largely confined to bases and the lines of communication. The
invention of a lighter, more portable and easily erected net-the "bush net"-
was made in the Middle East in 1941. It extended the possible use of nets almost
up to the front line, thus making a great advance in potential protection
against mosquitoes.
10Anti-mosquito Veils and. Gloves.-Veils of mosquito netting and canvas gloves
were an original issue to our troops, to protect them from mosquito bites when not
covered by a net. The smallness of the mesh needed to ensure protection, made
the veils so stuffy, and so diminished visual acuity, that they were seldom properly
used. The gloves were also hot and difficult to work with. The provision of
DMP-impregnated wide-mesh veils and gloves had none of these objections. In
addition they afford much protection for personnel sleeping without nets.
Arrangements were being made to supply such veils and gauntlets when the
war stopped.
(II) COLLECTIVE PROTECTION.
In fixed camps and bases, the screening of quarters, hospitals, etc., was
advocated. This measure was largely employed by the American troops, very
many of whom were already "screen-conscious" before entering the army.
Unfortunately it was never extensively used by the British forces, partly because
of personal objections to being "shut in a meat safe," and partly because of
shortage of appropriate materials.
II. REDUCTION IN THE NUMBERS OF MOSQUITOES.
The chances of being bitten by an infected insect can be greatly reduced either-
(a) by avoiding, when possible, places where such insects are prevalent (environ-
mental measures), or (b) by reducing the number of mosquitoes in the vicinity
of one's enforced habitat (anti-mosquito measures).
(a) Environmental Measures against Mosquito Bites.
These consist in avoiding, where possible, such situations and times in which
infected bites are likely to be received.
(i) Avoidance of Malarious Situations.-Napoleon said that "the choice of a
healthy camp site is one of the first of all military considerations.". This is equally
true to-day, and is especially true in regard to malaria.
In the selection of such sites, it is not only necessary to avoid the vicinity of
mosquito-breeding places, but also the habitations of malarious persons from
whom the mosquitoes can acquire infections.
In actual contact with the enemy, this may not always be possible. Nevertheless
the selection of healthy sites, or those which can rapidly be made healthy by anti-
mosquito measures, is one of the most important means of protection against
malaria.
This method was widely used in the Syrian campaign and the occupation of
1941-43, with most excellent results.9 As the troops advanced, detailed malarial
surveys were rapidly made, and maps prepared showing the best positions for
camp sites. These were widely issued within a few days to all commands, and
9. This policy received the active support of the Staff. As a result of this method, combined
with a vigorous anti-mosquito campaign (and quinine suppression to a less extent), the malarial
incidence was kept at a very low level. In spite of active warfare during the height of the
summer malaria season, and the occupation of the country during the even more dangerous autumn
months, the incidence was only about five per ceint. On the other hand, for the period May to
November, 1918, it was forty-tlhree per cent. A similar policy was taken up in Iraq with fine
results (vide Graph VII).
11the routine orders were also that a medical officer (a malaria expert when possible)
should be consulted in the selection of new camp sites, especially those fo* large
camps or installations. This was possible because the distribution of malaria was
patchy.
On the other hand in Burma and Assam, the physiography of the terrain and
strategic reasons usually made this well nigh impossible. All the country was
highly malarious, and more especially the camp sites necessitated by strategic
reasons. However, as the result of many months of strenuous labour, many
relatively healthy "harbours" were made by monumental works of drainage
(hundreds of miles) and anti-mosquito measures.
In the highly malarious South-West Pacific zone, this was easier because the
scattered and sparse nature of the local population reduced the number of infected
insects in spite of the great anopheline prevalence. Unfortunately, when the troops
themselves became infected in large numbers, 'they acted as their own reservoirs
of infection until their infectivity was very greatly reduced by suppressive
drug treatment (vide infra).
In the campaigns in Italy and Sicily, it was said that the enemy purposely
attempted to use malaria as an ally. While occupying the more healthy and
defensible hill areas, they attempted to confine our forces to the highly malarious
plains and marshy areas. They hoped that, as in Macedonia in 1916-18, our troops
would be rendered hors de combat by malaria, and so be easily defeated by their
healthier troops.
(ii) Avoidance of Malarious Times and Seasons.-As the mosquito is mainly
nocturnal in its habits, practically all infections are acquired after dusk. For this
reason, the minimum number of troops possible should be kept in dangerous areas
at night. The vicinity of villages, which usually harbour fnany infected mosquitoes,
should therefore be avoided after dusk. When this is not possible, the very strictest
measures of personal protection against bites should be used. The Australian
Forces were very insistent on this, with good results.
Climatic conditions often make malarial transmission seasonal in character.
Thus, during the colder season in the sub-tropics, there is little transmission, and,
although old infections may relapse, few or no fresh ones are acquired. For this
reason, few of the troops fighting near the highly malarious Anzio beachhead were
at risk in the early months, but would have been if they had not been able to advance
before the full malaria season began. Similarly some expeditions into areas of high
malarial potentialities were carried out during the off-season in the Burma-Assam
theatre with little malaria risk. Later excursions made during the malaria season
proved bow dangerous such regions could be, unless appropriate anti-malarial
measures were strictly used.
(b) Anti-Mosquito Measures.
The chances of being bitten by an infective mosquito can also be reduced by
causing a diminution in the number of dangerous mosquitoes, by attacks upon them
in either the adult or the immature stages of their lives.
12(1) ANTI-ADULT MEASURES.
During the 1914-18 War, the chief methods available against adult insects were
swatting and fumigation. Neither of these was very effective in practice.
In the interval between the wars, great advances were made in mosquito control
by the use of insecticidal spraying solutions. The most effective ingredient of these
was pyrethrum. Very fine results were achieved by this method against mosquitoes
which harbour in house during the daytime. It was, therefore, considered as one
of the chief anti-mosquito measures when the present war started, being much
more rapid in action than were anti-larval measures.
The entry of Japan into the war very greatly reduced the available supplies of
pyrethrum, although much was grown in Kenya. It, therefore, became a matter
of extreme urgency to augment and replace the available supplies. With this object
in view, very extensive researches were undertaken in both America and many
parts of the British Empire. Eventually it was discovered that a substance-
dichloro-diphenyl-trichlorcethane (commonly called DDT)-had unique insecticidal
properties. It was lethal in very small doses not only to adult mosquitoes but
also to larvae.
Although slower in its action than pyrethrum preparations, it was more deadly.
It also possessed another very important additional property, in that surfaces spread
with solutions retained their lethal character for long periods-in some circum-
stances even for months.
Unfortunately there are a number of dangerous species of anophelines which
do not shelter in houses during the daytime, such as A. minrimus, the most danger-
ous malaria vector of the South-East Asia region, and A. punctulatus of the South-
West Pacific zone. Diurnal spraying, therefore, while very effective against species
sheltering in houses, tents, etc., durirg the day (e.g., Mediterranean species), had
little chance of destroying these insects which made only transient nocturnal
visitations to get a blood meal. It is against this type of insect that the residual
effect of DDT is so useful. When the interiors of such habitations have been
residually sprayed, the chances are very great that at some visit the insects will
acquire a lethal dose by alighting even briefly upon some treated surface.
This residual effect was also taken advantage of on a large scale for outdoor
work. On the Burma-Assam front, not only were the outsides of habitations
sprayed weekly, but the camp area and a ring of about fifty yards around its
periphery was also treated. In this way insects which harboured outside habitations
during the day, would pick up a lethal dose on their journeys to and from the camp
to obtain blood meals.10
In addition, very many large-scale trials were made of spraying of DDT solutions
from the air, when large areas had to be protected, which could not be sprayed
properly nor quickly from the ground because of physical conditions or enemy
10. Spraying DDT both from the ground and the air is very popular with the troops, as it
reduces not only the mosquito population, but also the fly pest, which is usually so very prominent
in all tropical campaigns. There is also reason to suppose that it will have a very definite effect
in reducing other insect-borne diseases, such as dengue and sandfly fever.
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Eaction. It was also a rapid method of reducing mosquito prevalence, although
probably not so perfect as ground mnethods. The deposited spray acts on both adult
and larval mosquitoes.
These brilliant results were only obtained after very much laborious and intensive
research starting in 1942, and carried out by large numbers of scientific workers
in many parts of the British Empire and in the U.S.A., both in the laboratory
and in the field. Even yet the potentialities and limitations of this marvellous
insecticide have not yet been fully explored. There is no doubt, however, that it
has already proved of immense value in malaria control.
To implement the use of this insecticide under field conditions, large numbers
of different types of apparatus have been evolved to suit different circumstances.11
This has involved great intensive work, much of which has been carried out in
the field by -anti-malarial workers.
(2) ANTI-LARVAL MEASURES.
As the immature stages of mosquitoes can only live and develop in water, the
measures against them are all concerned with this element-"No exposed water,
no mosquitoes, no malaria."'
The various methods used in an anti-larval campaign are summarised in Table II.
TABLE II.
METHODS FOR THE CONTROL OF MOSQUITo BREEDING.
1. Reduction in the amount of exposed water edge.
(Drainage; filling; flooding, etc.).
2. Making water inaccessible to egg-laying.
(Screening; sub-soil drainage, etc.)
3. Making water conditions unsuitable for the development of larvae.
(Shading; chemical changes, physical changes, nutritional, etc.).
4. Direct destruction of the immature stages of mosquitoes.
(a) Mechanical (flushing; agitation; etc.).
(b) Larvicides (oil; paris gieen; DDT, etc.).
(c) Natural enemies (fish, insects, etc.).
5. Prevention of the formation of man-made and animal-made breeding
places.
All these methods have been used alone or in various combinations in different
theatres of war. It is not possible to deal in detail with all those used recently, but
only to mention especially those which have played prominent parts in the various
anti-malarial campaigns.
11. These include hand sprayers, power sprayers, etc. The use of this insecticide in a smoke
cloud is also receiving much attention, and would appear to have distinct potentialities for localised
and for widespread mosquito destruction in both war and peace.
14(a) Reduction of Exposed Water Edge.
Such methods have been widely used, often on a very large scale, to turn
unhealthy areas into relatively healthy ones. Very extensive drainage, filling, and
canalization works were carried out in the Middle East with great benefit. Similar
work was used in North Africa and Italy with good results, as was also the case
in the South-West Pacific theatre.
The most extensive works of this nature were those done on the Burma-Assam
Frontier. There all sites were very unhealthy, and enormous numbers of troops
had to pass through the same bases and camps along hundreds of miles of lines
of communication. At the main base at Manipur Road, Assam, about six hundred
miles of drains were constructed, and further forward at Palel about two hundred
miles, to mention the greatest examples.
Unfortunately much of this work had to be done by manual labour and was
necessarily very slow as a result.12 If mechanical excavators, etc., had been
available, much valuable time and sickness would have been saved, but those with
the force (and more) were all needed for other urgent military work, such as
road-making. The American Army, however, used such mechanical aids with
great success in theSouth-West Pacific area.
Such anti-larval methods are unfortunately slow in showing their effects, and
must be supplemented by other more rapid methods of destruction of both adult
and larval mosquitoes. They are, however, much more lasting in their effects, and
so are more suitable for permanent installations and bases than for transient camps.
(b) Making Water Inaccessible.
Subsoil drainage is too complicated a method and too slow in producing effects
to have a wide usage in war. In Palestine and Syria, the screening of wells was
a beneficial measure.
(c) Making WFater Conzditions Unsuitable.
In some places in the tropics, pools and similar collections of water were filled
with rank vegetation, which by rotting made them unsuitable for breeding
dangerous species of mosquito. Animal manure was used successfully for this
purpose in 1919 in the Afghan and Waziristan campaigns in India, but the
introduction of mechanical transport has much reduced the applicability of
this means.
(d) Direct Destruction of the Immature Stages of Mosquitoes.
(i) MECHANICAL DESTRUCTION.
Good results were obtained in some places by the destructive action of floods of
impounded water, released periodically by sluice gates or automatic syphon devices.
12. On the. Burma front especially, the resultant large aggregations of undisciplined tropical
*labour, mainly non-immune or semi-immune, formed a most suitable nidus for epidemics of malaria.
In keeping with past experience, some of these occurred with lamentable results in the early days.
Now that large supplies of mepticrine are available, suppressive treatment should remove this
menace in future.
15These are more applicable in hilly areas. Among other places they were used in
Syria, Burma, and the South-West Pacific.
The agitation of the water-edge by water transport along some of the canals in
Egypt appeared to have an anti-larval action.
(ii) LARVICIDES.
The anti-mosquito effects of drainage, etc., take some weeks to become evident.
This greatly reduces their usefulness for the large number of relatively temporary
camps needed in a war of movement. They must be supplemented by some more
rapid anti-larval measure, and here larvicides are used mainly. When the recent
war began, the two principal larvicides employed were oil and paris green, but
later the discovery of DDT was a great advance.
(1) Oils.-Oil was originally the most widely used larvicide and a very good one.
It required, however, a considerable staff and relatively large amounts of apparatus
to apply it, and was unsuitable for some conditions.13 As oil has so many other
uses in war, and many valuable oil fields in the East were later lost, the question
t)f the conservation of this material became a serious one. Another practical point
arose in the Burma campaign, where bulky supplies of oil had'to be conveyed over
hundreds of miles of road or flown to the front, when all available transport could
have been used for other urgent military supplies. This problem was solved, when
by the addition of DDT to the oil, the amounts needed became only about one-
thirtieth of those previously required.
(2) Paris Green.-This is a copper-arsenic compound which is distributed, usually
as a dust, on the surface of the water, where the anopheline larvae ingest it. It is
a very useful larvicide used from the ground. It is particularly adapted for spraying
from aeroplanes. This method was extensively employed with success in Italy for
the treatment of large breeding areas, usually swamps and other inaccessible
localities.14 A very valuable practical method of spraying a suspension of paris
green in water was used widely in the Middle East theatre against the larvae of
A. supe,rpictus, breeding in shallow pebbly streams.
(3) DDT.-Solutions of this insecticide in kerosene oil were found to produce
satisfactory results in amounts which would have required thirty times as much
unmixed oil. The larvicidal action of the solution was also more rapid. Apart from
the saving of transport mentioned previously, this resulted in an enormous saving
of labour, and a very great simplification of much of the apparatus needed to
supply larvicides.
13. The oils available came from very many different sources. They were found in practice to
vary considerably in their suitability for anti-larval work. Valuable research -work on this subject
was carried out by many field workers, often with the helpful collaboration of commercial
petroleum companies.
14. Large areas with scattered bomb-craters or flooded against tanks, were sometimes heavily
mined. This made them too dangerous to treat from the ground, and here air-spraying was very
useful.
16This larvicide only became available in large amounts about the middle of 1944,
but the results of its use were soon acclaimed in many theatres.15
(iii) NATURAL ENEMIES.
There are certain fish which are highly larvivorous. The chief one is an American
fish-Gambusia sp. In a few areas this was used to supplement other methods
of larval destruction.
(e) Prevention of Man-made or Anzimal-made Breedinig Places.
The activities of an army in a potentially malarious area are always followed
by the formation of new collections of water suitable for the breeding of mosquitoes,
and so for an increase of malaria.
The making of roads tends to block natural drainage channels, causing swamps
and pools. Mechanical transport, apart from breaching irrigation channels, etc.,
makes ruts in which water collects.16 Fresh excavations in which water lies are
made for various utilitarian purposes (borrow pits, wells, etc.), or are dug for
defensive reasons (trenches, dug-outs, etc.), or are produced by enemy action (bomb
craters). The results of these human activities often cause great rises in the malaria
potential of a locality. The strictest means are needed to stop them, ancd control
their results. a
The breaching of canals and the destruction of drainage works, especially in
Italy by the Germans, caused a great rise in mosquito production. While much of
this was probably intended primarily to hinder the progress of tanks or similar
weapons, there is considerable reason to suspect that it was also intended to
enlist malaria as an ally.
B. Anti-Malarial Measures Directed Against the Parasite.
Theoretically one should attack the parasite in both the insect and the human
hlost to prevent malaria.
I. ATTACK UPON INFECTIONS IN THE INSECT HOST.
Conditions of temperature will influence adversely the development of the parasite
in the mosquito, and low humidity may cut the insect's life span so short that the
parasite cannot develop up to the infective stage before its host dies. Apart from
these natural factors, no practical means are known to kill the infection in the
host apart from its death. These natural events determine the occurrence and
duration of the malarial transmission season, and, as has been mentioned above,
this has been taken advantage of where Fossible.
15. WVlile it must be acknowledged that DDT is a most marvellous insecticide, it is still too
early to laud it as the panacea for all malarial ills. Much research has still to be done to determine
the best, the safest, the most economical, and the most practicable methods of using it. Often
untoward results, wvhich would be of comparatively negligible importance in xvar, would be other-
wise in peace-time conditions. DDT kills almost all species of insect with which it comes in
contact. Howv this will eventually affect the balance of nature in localities where it is used, has
still to be determined. It is quite probable that its indiscriminate use may have harmful effects
upon such useful insects as bees or other pollinators of plants, as well as upon insects useful as
destroyers of agricultural and horticultural pests.
16. The latter was a serious problem in the South-West Pacific theatre, as such ruts formed
ideal breeding-places for the dangerous local vector, A. punctulatus.
17
FII. ATTACK UPON INFECTITNS IN THE HUMAN HOST.
(a) Measuires Relating to the Suisceptible 1u11man Host.
It is well known that different races, and even different individuals, vary
considerably in the intensities of their reactions to malarial infections. This is apart
from the grades of severity conditioned by the effects of different species
of Plasinodium.
Many aboriginal races, such as Africans, have developed a considerable degree
of natural tolerance to malarial infectionis through long ages of consociation with
the parasite. When this has been reinforced, as it usually is, by an increased
tolerance acquired as the result of continue(d multiple infections in early life, the
degree of immunity, to local strainis of parasite at least, may be very high
(Sinton, 1939).
This was one of the reasons for the employment of African troops in the highly
malarious tracts of South-East Asia. This (lecision was amply justified, for the
malarial morbidity among such troops was relatively small as comparedl with that
amoing the non-immutne Europeans, or cven the semi-immune Indians. TIhe
Europeans, who had never had any chance of (leveloping either racial or acquired
tolerance, suffere(d severely.
The employment of such more tolerant troops has an important place in
military medicine.
(b) Direct Attack utponi the Parasites in the Human.) Host.
The chemo-therapeutic attack upon malarial parasites in the human host falls
into two main groups-
(i) Methods to reduce the infectivity of the human host to mosquitoes by
destruction or (levitalisation of the sexual parasites, an(l
(ii) Methods of attack upon the parasites capable of causing clinical
manifestations (i.e., the asexual parasites).
(i) REDUCTION IN THE INFECTIVITY OF THE HUMAN HOST.
To be infective to the mosquito, the human host must carry gametocytes (sexual
parasites) in his peripheral blood. There is a (Irug-pamaquin (plasmoquine)-
which will destroy these potentially dangerous forms, even when taken in small
doses. As the main human reservoirs of infection in war are usually the uncontroll-
able focal population, the drug could not be widelv used for this purpose. Its use
was mainly confined to special circumstances, or it was taken as an adjuvant to
other anti-plasmodial therapy to reduce the infectivity of patients suffering from
severe attacks of the disease.
The routine use of mepacrine suppressive treatment (vide infra), by keeping at
a very low level the number of asexual parasites from which the gametocvtes are
(lerived, had a most beneficial indirect effect in lowering infectivitv. rhis was
especially the case in the South-West Pacific theatre, where the infected native
population was scanty locally, andl where the main reservoir of infection grew
eventually to be the troops themselves at one time. The rigid enforcement of
mepacrine suppression ha(d a great effect in reducing the infectivitv of these troops.
18TFhis is one of the reasons why such therapy should always be a routine in highly
malarious regions where anophelines are abundant and uncontrolled.
(ii) METHODS OF ATTACK ON THE DISEASE-PRODUCING PARASITES.
These may be roughly divided into three groups (Sinton, 1945)-
(1) The prevention of the acquisition of infection (True Causal Prophylaxis).
(2) Methods aiming at a rapid clinical cure17 of malarial attacks and, if
possible, at the same time a rapid radical onel7 (Curative Therapy), and
(3) Methods aiming at the prevention or suppression of clinical manifes-
tations in individuals already infected (Suppressive Therapy).
(1) True Casual Prophylaxis.
Until quite recently no drug was known that in therapeutic doses was capable
of killing the form of parasite injected by the mosquito (sporozoites) before they
couli initiate infection in the human host. rhe researches of the Australian team
at Cairns have produced strong evidence that the new British drug, Paludrine, may
have such an action against certain species of Plasmodium. If this be confirmed,
it is an epoch-making discovery which should have far-reaching results upon the
prevention of malaria, both in peace and war.
(2) Curative Methods.
The two main drugs used for this purpose in the recent war were quinine and
mepacrine (atebrin; quinacrine).
Quinine has a rapid action in cutting short acute clinical attacks. Given alone,
it is probably less certain in producing radical cures in certain infections, and is
much more unpleasant to take than mepacrine. Intravenous injections are, however,
still the standby in the treatment of pernicious attacks, and have saved large
numbers of lives during the war.
In 1939, quinine was the most widely used drug for malaria therapy. It had been
the chief therapeutic agent in malaria for over a century. Physicians were familiar
witlh its use, and supplies were available to the Allies. On the other hand, our
knowledge of the advantages and limitations of the synthetic drug, mepacrine, was
still very incomplete, and the bulk of the supply was held by the enemy.
When, however, the Japanese invaded Java, they captured most of the quinine
supplies of the world. As a result, the Allies had to find a substitute. Consequently
the manufacture of mepacrine was started on an enormous scale in both Great
Britain and the U.S.A. This was a blessing in disguise, for the very great experi-
ence of the properties of this drug gained in the laboratory, in hospitals, and in the
field during the past five years, has shown that for most military purposes
mepacrine is much superior to quinine.
In the original daily dosage used (0.3 grm.), mepacrine was slower in its action
on clinical manifestations than was quinine. For this reason the original Army
standard treatment recommended quinine as the drug of choice during the first
17. A "clinical cure" is merely the abolition of the clinical manifestations of which the patient
complains at the time. Unless, however, the infection is eradicated at the same time ("radical
cure"), these symptoms may recur at a later date (Sinton, 1945).
19few days andl then mepacrine to complete the course.18 When later the dlosage of
mepacrine was raised to 0.6 or even 1.0 grm. daily, for the first three days, its
action xvas speeded up, and now many physicians use mepacrine only as a clinically
curative agent an(l often as a radical one.
The stanclard treatment of malaria has so improved that the Australians in the
South-West Pacific theatre report that the case-mortality in uncomplicated cases
was only 1 in 3,000 during 194:3-44. (Fairley, 1943). This is about one-fifteenth of
that recorded in Macedonia during 1916-18.
In the case of raclical cures, standard treatments with quinine and mepacrine
lasting seven to ten days are effective against the great majority of malignant
tertian infections. Mepacrinie is also probably more certain in its effects against
this infection andl is certainly more pleasant to take.
In benign tertian infections, however, while numbers of cases are radically curecl
by such routine treatment, a large proportion (as high as fifty per cent. is reported)
may relapse at a later date.19 When in the field so long as suppressive mepacrine
treatment is taken properly, these latent infections seldom or never become evidlent,
as they are more easily held in check than are malignant tertian ones.
As occurred after the 1914-18 War, such relapsing benign tertian infections have
given rise to a serious problem among troops returning to the United Kingdom,
the U.S.A., and Australia, where suppressive therapy cannot be continued as a
routine when such large numbers of troops are involved, both infected and non-
infected. It loomed up as a post-war problem.19 Tlhe clinical attacks are not
dangerous and are easily cured, but radical cure is produce(d in a re&atively small
number of cases by any one course osf standar(d treatment. It has been found,
however, that the combined quinine-pamaquin treatment elaborated in Indlia many
years ago (Sinton et al., 1928-1930), will cure radically a very high percenitage of
such chronic benign tertian infections. This shouldl be a great help in this post-war
problem.
(3) Suppressive TFreatmlent.
Suppressive treatment with either quinine or mepacrine does tiot prevent menl
acquiring malarial infection-it is not a true causal prophylact c, as was once
thought. It acts by keeping the number of parasites in the Lody at such a low
level that clinical manifestations are suppressedl. In this way men are kept in a
condition fit to perform their duties in spite of beinig- infected. It is used 'n war to
conserve man-power and efficiency, under conditions in which it would be imprac-
ticable to prevent by other means a high malarial morbidity rate.
The main beneficial effects of such treatment are-
(a) It dliminishes morbidity and so conserves man-power and efficiency, both
physical and mental;
18. This method is still considered that of choice by many doctors as compared with mepacrine
.ilone.
19. For allmost a decade after the cessation of hostilities in the First World XVar, many govern-
ments continued to pay pensions to ex-sol(liers for ailments claimed to be "chronic malaria." It
is now known that benign tertian infections rarely, if ever, last mor-e than three years, and
mialignant tertian ones more than one year. They tend to die out naturally regardless of therapy.
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__ I(b) It reduces the severity of cliniical attacks, and so the mortality rate;
(c) It (liminishes inclirectly the number of sexual parasites in the peripheral blood
and the prevalence of gametocyte carriers, so reducing the spread of infection;
(d) It diminishes the tendency to blackwater fever;
(e) It assists in the development of tolerance to infection, and
(f) If continued long enough, it will cure radically many infections, more
especially malignanit tertian ones.
The two drugs used for this purpose were quinine and mepacrine.
Quininle has long been employed as a "prophylactic" in many countries. Its
beneficial effects are most evi(lent in immune an(d semi-immune populations, or in
the presence of relatively low malarial transmission, especially of benign tertian
malaria. Wlheni, however, our non-immune European troops were exposed to severe
malarial con(litions on field service, it failedl to prevent a high morbiditv rate wheni
giveni in a dosage which was practicable for continuous usage. In addition, its
bitter taste anid other unpleasanit effects ma(le it unlpopular, so it was avoicle(d by
the troops when possible.
A large series of trials of suppressive mepacrine sponsored by the Malaria
Commission of the League of Nations about 1935, showed that a decsage of 0.2 grm.
of mepacrine given twice weekly was as good, if not better, than five to six grains
of quininie daily, anid was more agreeable to take.
TIhe experience gathered in the Second World War has shown that this dosage
is insufficient for a non-immune population in the presence of severe infection. Tlhe
daily dosage was finally increased up to 0.1 grm. daily (a total of 0.7 grm. weekly),
xvith a great improvement in morbidity (Graph IV). This dosage whenz strictly
enforced achieved remarkable results.20 Thus among the Australian Forces in
New Guinea, an average malarial inci(lence of 740 per 1,000 per annum in December,
1943, had fallen to 26 a year later (Fairley, 1945; Covell, 1945) (Graph I). In one
Corps in Burma, the average daily rate per 1,000 fell in two months from about
1.75 to 0.2 (Graph II). Similar results were reported from West Africa (Graph Ill).
Tlhe rises of malarial morbidiity which follow upon the stoppage of suppression are
shown in Graphs V and VI.
Mepacrine has also another great advantage in that when such suppression is
continued for about one month after leaving a malarious area, it produces a radical
cure of practically all malignant tertian infections. It is extremely rare for a relapse
to occur. It is, however, otherwise with benign tertian malaria, relapses fr-om
20. While malariologists were convinced of the invaluable effects of such suppression, it was very
difficult to convince the combatant officer and some medical officers that the reported failures wvere
due to failure to take the drug in the dosage ordered. It was suggested that such apparent failures
were due to a variety of factors only encountered in the field-fatigue, cold, mental strain, lowv
diet, etc. It was the brilliantly planned and executed investigations carried out by the Australian
L.H.Q. Medical Research Unit, directed by Brigadier N. Hamilton Fairley, A.A.M.C., at Cairns,
which were conducted on human volunteers, that dealt with all these points practically, and proved
conclusively that 0.1 grm. mepacrine taken daily without fail would absolutely suppress the clinical
manifestations of malarial infection. (Full details are given by Fairley, 1945.)
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1944 1945which may have serious repercussions on man-power at a later date after suppres-
sion has ceased (vide supra).
These brilliant results can only be producedl by very rigid dliscipline in the enforce-
ment of suppressive treatment to all men on all days.20 Slackness in the daily
GRAPH No. VII.
EFFEC1S OF INfXIVE ANTI-ALRAL,
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indigestion of the proper dosage of the drug is followed by a rise in malarial
morbiditv.
Some of the main advantages of mepacrine suppression over quinine for troops
are
(a) It does not interfere with their mental and physical activities;
(b) Its protection lasts longer because of its slower excretion;
(c) Relatively larger therapeutic doses are easily tolerated;
(d) Prolonged ingestion (years) has caused relatively few undesirable effects.
(The man-power lost to the army through such idiosyncrasies was infinitesmal
as compared with the man-poweruconserved), and
(e) If continued for a month after leaving a malarious area, practically all
malignant (and probably many benign) tertian infections are radically cured.
25It has, however, the disadvantage that it dyes the skin yellow, but this is
neither a toxic effect nor a jaundice.21
With the proper enforcement of suppressive mepacrine a force can maintain
itself for many months in the field with a relatively loW malarial incidence. This
is possible under conditions where, without it, the disease would put the force out
of action within a few weeks.
'The use of suppression must never be considered to justify any relaxation in the
enforcement of measures of personal protection against mosquito bites and so
against malarial infection. Any negligence of these measures will be shown at a
later date by benigl tertian relapses, which may have serious repercussions on
ma,n-power.
For all schemes for malaria control in war, one must adopt the axiom of
Cromwell-"Neglect no means.1"
ANTI-MALARIAL ORGANISATION AND RESEACH.
The fine results which were achieved in many theatres were gained by no primrose
path, but, as always in malaria control, by "blood and toil, sweat and tears."
The Army formed a special Malaria Branch of its Hygiene Department in 1939.
Too much credit cannot be given to the field units of the British Forces who con-
ceived and carried out the various control schemes in different regions.
The Malaria Field Laboratories were staffed by experts from all parts of the
Empire. They were a new type of unit, solely concerned with the prevention of
malaria and not with clinical treatment. 'l'hey surveyed, evaluated, and advised
upon the special malaria problems of their areas. In addition, they carried out very
much most valuable research and teaching work. The schemes drawn up by these
experts were executed by energetic Anti-Malarial Units-another new kind of unit,
under the supervision of the officers of the Malaria Field Laboratories and officers
of the Hygiene Department.
Both these types of anti-malarial units did not confine their activities merely to
the bases and lines of communication. Many sections were found working
immediately behind the front lines within range of shell-fire and doing duties of
inestimable value.
In addition to the field workers, from the early stages of war, numerous expert
teams of "back-room boys," mainly civilian, were engaged in researches directed
to find new methods for defeating the mosquito and the malaria parasite. These
were not only medical men, but enthusiastic scientists of all kinds-entomologists,
chemists, physicists, physiologists, engineers, etc. Never in history has so much
talent been concentrated upon the control of a single clisease. rhe thanks of the
Army and the Empire is due to these too-often forgotten workers.
Those discoveries which appeared promising in the laboratory were immediately
tried out in the field by units of the Malaria Organisation or by special teams of
21. The two new anti-malarial drugs (Paludrine, the British one, and SN 7618, the American one)
have not this disadvantage. Preliminary reports suggest that these drugs may be even more
effective than mepacrine. This, however, requires further confirmation in the field and over a
much longer period of time and experience.
26experts. In this way their importance and(l practicability under field-service con-
ditioins were evaluated. lThe field units, by reporting the practical difficulties or
shortcomings of the, methods under test, were able to guide the experimental
workers in remedying the defects.
BENEFITlS ARISINGI FROM MALARIA IN WAR.
Ihat great physician Osler has said that "If a census were taken among the
world's workers on disease, the judgment to be based on the damage to health and
direct mortality, the votes would be given to malaria as the greatest single destroyer
of the human race." Apart from the destruction of life and health, the national,
social, and economic losses caused by this disease are unbelievable (Sinton, 1935,
1936).
While the recent war has caused lamentable effects in many countries, there is
no doubt that the brilliant advances in malaria control resulting from war con-
ditions, will do much to benefit millions of people and enormous tracts of the globe
in the future.22
The recent war has resulted in such a drive into methods for controlling this
disease as has never been seen before. The basic researches carried out in the
United Kingdom, in the U.S.A., in Australia, in India and other parts of the
British Empire, have resulted in what will probably prove to be epoch-making
discoveries. From the humanitarian standpoint, these should have far-reaching
effects in diminishing the morbidity and mortality from malaria. From the economic
aspect, they may make possible to an undreamed-of extent the exploitation of the
great natural resources of the tropics for the benefit of all mankind.
Some of the outstanding benefits are:-
(a) A tremendous stimulus to all aspects of malaria prevention and control;
(b) The discovery of new anti-malarial drugs of great promise;
(c) A great expansion of our knowledge of the basic principles of the mode of
actionl of anti-malarial drugs, both new and(l old, anid their limitations;
(d) 'lhe (liscovery of marvellous nlew inlsectici(les;
(e) Better methods for the practieal application of both new and old methods
of malaria control.
From this it can be seen that out of the evils of war many good things may
spring.
22. In many places the anti-malarial measures carried out by the troops had an immediate
effect in improving the health of the local poopulation.
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101 CLINICAL DEMONSTRATIONS TO NURSES. By Hamilton Bailey,
F.R.C.S. 2nd Edition. 135 pages. E. & S. Livingstone. 10s. 6d.
Tiiis little volume contains a miscellany of brief "clinical" demonstrations, each case being
simply and clearly told and illustrated by. particularly good photographs. or coloured plates.
The subjects vary from a "black eye" to ectophia vesicoe.
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